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ALL PROPERTIES ARE DIVINE OR GOD EXISTS
The Sacred Thesis and its Ontological Argument
To the union of Åslaug Hegstad and Lars Eivind Lervåg
Abstract. A metaphysical system engendered by a third order quantified
modal logic S5 plus impredicative comprehension principles is used to isolate
a third order predicate D, and by being able to impredicatively take a
second order predicate G to hold of an individual just if the individual
necessarily has all second order properties which are D we in Section 2
derive the thesis (40) that all properties are D or some individual is G. In
Section 3 theorems 1 to 3 suggest a sufficient kinship to Gödelian ontological
arguments so as to think of thesis (40) in terms of divine property and
Godly being; divine replaces positive with Gödel and others. Thesis (40),
the sacred thesis, supports the ontological argument that God exists because
some property is not divine. In Section 4 a fixed point analysis is used as
diagnosis so that atheists may settle for the minimal fixed point. Theorem 3
shows it consistent to postulate theistic fixed points, and a monotheistic
result follows if one assumes theism and that it is divine to be identical
with a deity. Theorem 4 (the Monotheorem) states that if Gg and it is
divine to be identical with g, then necessarily all objects which are G are
identical with g. The impredicative origin of D suggests weakened Gaunilo-
like objections that offer related theses for other second order properties and
their associated diverse presumptive individual bearers. Nevertheless, in the
last section we finesse these Gaunilo-like objections by adopting what we
call an apathiatheistic opinion which suggest that the best concepts ‘God’
allow thorough indifference as to whether God exists or not.
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1. Introduction
We employ the word “divine” instead of “positive” as in foregoing lit-
erature to expose certain conceptual connections which diverges from
the Leibnizian philosophy that influenced Gödel. The term “the sacred
thesis” is used as a metonym for the main title. Section 2 gives an
account of the syntax and the evaluation semantics of the metaphysical
system we presuppose, and it contains philosophical matters as well as
a general discussion of higher order modal logic. Section 3 shows how
impredicative comprehension with a third order modal logic suffices to
define the second order property divine and the first order property God
so as to establish the sacred thesis. Section 4 isolates some theorems
which relate the work of Section 2 to modern work on modal ontological
arguments originating with Gödel’s work divulged in 1970 and accounted
for most thoroughly in [15]. The conceptual and historical connections
evidenced suggest that the use of terms as in the sacred thesis is jus-
tified. Section 5 points out how the sacred thesis induces an affiliated
ontological argument, and it offers some considerations pertinent to the
suggested reasoning and related ontological arguments. The concluding
Section 6 proposes an apathiatheistic attitude to whether or not there
is a God, and the advocated indifference gives room for admitting the
soundness of the advanced ontological argument without committing to
epistemological superstition.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we seek to make a fairly precise exposition of the system
we use, and we relate some references to the literature in order to facili-
tate comparisons for the reader, and we put forward some philosophical
comments.
2.1. Syntax
We let the set of symbols A = {∀, ↓, x,X, X, a, A,A,′ ,} be the alphabet
of the formal language L, and define the constants, variables and terms
of order one, two and three:
(I) x (X , X) is a first (second, third) order variable.
(II) If y (Y , Y) is a first (second, third) order variable then y′, (Y ′, Y′)
is a first (second, third) order variable.
(III) a (A, A) is a first (second, third) order constant.
All properties are divine or God exists 331
(IV) If b (B, B) is a first (second, third) order constant then b′, (B′, B′)
is a first (second, third) order constant.
(V) There are no more constants or variables.
(VI) All and only first (second, third) order constants and variables are
first (second, third) order terms.
We define the set of formulas in a Polish manner:
(i) If T is a second order and t a first order term then Tt is a formula.
(ii) If T is a third order and T a second order term then TT is a
formula.
(iii) If α is a formula then α is a formula.
(iv) If α and β are formulas then ↓αβ is a formula.
(v) if y is a first order variable and α is a formula then ∀yα is a formula.
(vi) If Y is a second order variable and α is a formula then ∀Y α is a
formula.
(vii) If Y is a third order variable and α is a formula then ∀Yα is a
formula.
(viii) Nothing else is a formula.
On the basis of the definitions above wherein parentheses are not needed,
we use the following metalinguistic conventions to facilitate reading:
(A) Instead of t (T , T) followed by a finite number of ′ as per (i) ((ii),
(iii)) above we use succeeding letters of the appropriate alphabet
for first (second, third) order terms in the exposition.
(B) (¬α) is short for ↓ αα,
(C) (α ∨ β) is short for ↓↓ αβ ↓ αβ,
(D) (α ∧ β) is short for ↓↓ αα ↓ ββ,
(E) (α→ β) is short for (¬α ∨ β),
(F) (α↔ β) is short for ((α→ β) ∧ (β → α)),
(G) (∃y)α is short for ¬(∀y)¬α,
(H) (∃B)α is short for ¬(∀B)¬α,
(I) (∃B)α is short for ¬(∀B)¬α and
(J) ♦α is short for ¬¬α.
(K) Parentheses which are not needed to disambiguate are supressed
for legibility as the occasion allows.
We define the set of free first (second, third) order variables in a formula:
(a) FV1(Ta) = ∅,
332 Frode Alfson Bjørdal
(b) FV1(Ty) = {y},
(c) FV1(α) = FV1(α),
(d) FV1(↓ αβ) = FV1(α) ∪ FV1(β),
(e) FV1(∀yα) = FV1(α) \ {y},
(f) FV2(TA) = ∅,
(g) FV2(TY ) = {Y },
(h) FV2(α) = FV2(α),
(i) FV2(↓ αβ) = FV2(α) ∪ FV2(β),
(j) FV2(∀Bα) = FV2(α) \ {B},
(k) FV3(AT ) = ∅,
(l) FV3(YT ) = {Y},
(m) FV3(α) = FV3(α),
(n) FV3(↓ αβ) = FV3(α) ∪ FV1(β),
(o) FV3(∀Yα) = FV3(α) \ {Y}.
We let α⌈t/y⌉ (α⌈T/Y ⌉, α⌈T/Y⌉) denote the formula obtained by
substituting all free occurrences of the first (second, third) order variable
y (Y , Y) in α with the first (second, third) order term t (T , T). A first
(second, third) order variable y (Y , Y) is substitutable for first (second,
third) order variable z (Z, Z) in α just if y (Y , Y) is free in α⌈y/z⌉
(α⌈Y/Z⌉, α⌈Y/Z⌉) precisely where z (Z, Z) is free in α, and a first
(second, third) order constant is a closed term so substitutable for any
first (second, third) order variable in any formula.
The presence of Barcan formulas and their converses of all orders
facilitate the definition of prenex normal form of formulas made use of
in defining a formula as ∆10 iff it is equivalent to a formula that has no
second order or third order quantifiers, and as Σ11 (Π
1
1) iff it is equivalent
to a formula with just existential (universal) second order quantifiers to
begin with in its prenex normal form. We write that a formula schema
is properly parametrized if it just contains second order or third order
constants that have already been introduced earlier in a derivation where
it occurs.
2.2. Axiom schemas for the logic Q3S5
The superscript 3 on Q indicates that third order quantification is in-
cluded, and we take the inclusion of the Barcan formulas at any order
as default.
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A1 α→ (β → α)
A2 (α→ (β → γ))→ ((α→ β)→ (α→ γ))
A3 (¬β → ¬α)→ (α→ β)
K (α→ β)→ (α→ β)
4 α→ α
B α→ ♦α
T α→ α
Q00 ∀xα↔ ∀xα
Q10 ∀Xα↔ ∀Xα
Q20 ∀Xα↔ ∀Xα
Q01 ∀xα→ α⌈t/x⌉, provided t is substitutable for x in α.
Q11 ∀Xα→ α⌈T/X⌉, provided T is substitutable for A in α.
Q21 ∀Xα→ α⌈T/X⌉, provided T is substitutable for X in α.
Q02 ∀x(α→ β)→ (∀xα→ ∀xβ)
Q12 ∀X(α→ β)→ (∀Xα→ ∀Xβ)
Q22 ∀X(α→ β)→ (∀Xα→ ∀Xβ)
Q03 α→ ∀xα, provided x is not in FV1(α).
Q13 α→ ∀Xα, provided X is not in FV2(α).
Q23 α→ ∀Xα, provided X is not in FV3(α).
2.3. Inference rules and a derivation rule for Q3S5
We write ⊢ α for the statement that α is a thesis of Q3S5, and all axioms
of subsection 2.2 (stated without parameters) are theses. We first state
the five inference rules for Q3S5:
Modus ponens: ⊢ α& ⊢ (α→ β)⇒⊢ β
Necessitation: ⊢ α⇒⊢ α
1-Generalization: ⊢ α⇒⊢ ∀xα
2-Generalization: ⊢ α⇒⊢ ∀Xα
3-Generalization: ⊢ α⇒⊢ ∀Xα
A derivation △ of Q3S5 is a finite sequence of formulas each of which
is an instance of an axiom of Q3S5 or resulting from earlier elements of
△ by means of one of the five inference rules above or by a use of the
derivation rule Existential Instantiation which requires that just if one in
constructing a derivation △ reaches a first (second, third) order formula
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∃xα (∃Xα, ∃Xα) and constant b (B, B) has not been used earlier in △
may one existentially instantiate with said constant and in a succeeding
step of the derivation △ put α⌈b/x⌉ (α⌈B/X⌉, α⌈B/X⌉).
All the inference rules Modus Ponens, Necessitation, 1-Generaliza-
tion, 2-Generalization and 3-Generalization are as well derivation rules
in that they may be appealed to unrestrictedly in any derivation. As
pointed out we avail ourselves of the derivation rule Existential Instan-
tiation which we consider proper as a specific instantiation of a constant
that it may allow at a stage in a given derivation △ may be prohibited
at stages in derivation △′.
We illustrate the use of constants in deriving Σ11-comprehension from
Π11-comprehension for a given formula ψ where we have that ∃Y∀x(Y x
↔ ∀Zψ). Existentially instantiate with a constant A so that ∀x(Ax↔
∀Zψ). Use the constant A as a parameter so we have ∃W∀x(Wx ↔
∀Z¬Ax). The last quantifier is superfluous as ∃W∀x(Wx ↔ ¬Ax),
and we next existentially instantiate with B to obtain ∀x(Bx↔ ¬Ax);
as ∀x(Ax ↔ ∀Zψ), we derive ∀x(Bx ↔ ¬∀Zψ) and so by letting
φ be ¬ψ and using existential generalization justified by Q11 we get
∃Y∀x(Y x↔ ∃Zφ).
2.4. Semantics
2.4.1. Philosophical remarks
In order to account for the meaning of the axiom schemas just given and
the derivation and inference rules, we will elaborate upon the evaluation
semantics for modal logic introduced by the author in [3] as this simplifies
some matters. A translation to an account in a more standard possible
worlds semantics may be undertaken, but the evaluation semantics we
give has some independent interest which we point out. Notice well
that the evaluation semantics we propose differs from Carnap’s state
description semantics and it does not as the latter validate the formula
♦α for any atomic formula α; for more on this arguably unwelcome
feature of Carnap’s state description semantics, confer [9].
It is true that a variety of entities can take the place of possible worlds
in accounting for modal logics, and indeed a lot of theories have been
offered even to clarify the meaning of the term “possible world”. How-
ever, it is vitally important that the semantical apparatus presupposed
also does justice to the way we speak as well as to the ontological econ-
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omy of our commitments. As I see it, the evaluation semantics is quite
advantageous on these scores as it simplifies matters ontologically and
operates with just one domain of discourse. The evaluation semantics
does thus not in the semantics commit to anything like possible worlds,
which have shown themselves prone to lead philosophical and related
discourse astray. Instead the valuations of the evaluation of any model
are intuitively just the properties, states or situations the world may be
in; model theoretically the valuations are just properties of formulas or
ordered pairs from variables and objects with an appropriate set theo-
retical relation to the domain of discourse. As I see it there is nothing
ontologically untoward by a metalogical commitment to properties which
are not instantiated by the world, and we do not intend the evaluation
semantics to account for what it means to be a property.
Accordingly the evaluationist semantics induces a replacement of the
slogan that necessary truths are to be identified with “truth in all possible
worlds” with the motto that “a necessary truth is a statement that is
true in all possible states of the world”.
2.4.2. Evaluation models
A novelty with the evaluation semantics is the unusual conditions rhom-
bicity and quadrangularity for order 1 through 3 which justify the Barcan
formula and its converse at that order. Pay also attention to the fact
that we do not invoke the power set of the domain of discourse in our
statement of the semantics. We suppress the semantical consideration
of constants in derivations in this exposition. In the next subsection we
illustrate how the semantics validates a selection of axioms and infer-
ence rules of the third order logic Q3S5, and we further below introduce
a moderate level of second order and third order comprehension.
Let an evaluation model M be a triple 〈D,E,R〉 where D is the
domain of discourse, E is an evaluation and R ⊂ E2 is the accessibility
relation on E. An evaluation E is a set of valuations, and the latter we
denote by V , V ′ and its kins. Valuations are monadic properties or at-
tributes or states which only hold of some formulas of L and some ordered
pairs 〈y, d〉 (〈Y, δ〉, 〈Y,∆〉 )where y (Y , Y ) is a first, (second, third) order
variable of L and d (δ, ∆) is intuitively the value the valuation assigns
the said variable relative to the domain of discourse D: If V ∈ E and y
is a first order variable of L then V(〈y, d〉) only if d ∈ D. If V ∈ E and
Y is a second order variable then V(〈Y, δ〉) only if δ ⊂ D. If V ∈ E and
Y is a third order variable then V(〈Y,∆〉) only if ∀x(x ∈ ∆⇒ x ⊂ D).
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Valuations are to be functional in that for V ∈ E and y a first order
variable V(〈y, d〉) and V(〈y, d‘〉) only if d is d‘, so we write V (y) = d
for V (〈y, d〉); we for the same reason write V (Y ) = δ for V (〈y, δ〉) and
V (Y) = ∆ for V (〈Y,∆〉).
For any first (second, third) order variable y (Y , Y) we write V y©V ′
(V Y©V ′, V Y©V ′) to express that V and V ′ at most differ in that V (y) 6=
V ′(y).
To save space we use Σ and Π for existential and universal generali-
sation at the metalevel, and for the same reason we use ∼ for negation,
⇒ for implication. ⇔ for biimplication and & for conjunction at the
metalevel.
With these notions we require for any model M = 〈D,E,R〉 and
V ∈ E and first order variable y, second order variable Y , third order
variable Y and formulas α, β ∈ L:
1-denotation: Σd(d ∈ D & V (y) = d)
2-denotation: Σδ(δ ⊂ D & V (Y ) = δ)
3-denotation: Σ∆(Πy(y ∈ ∆⇒ (y ⊂ D)) & V (Y) = ∆)
Higher atoms: V (YY )⇔ (V (Y ) ∈ V (Y))
Lower atoms : V (Y y)⇔ (V (y) ∈ V (Y ))
NOR: V (↓ αβ)⇔ (∼V (α) &∼V (β))
1-Generality: V (∀yα)⇔ ΠV ′(V y©V ′ ⇒ V ′(α))
2-Generality: V (∀Y α)⇔ ΠV ′(V Y©V ′ ⇒ V ′(α))
3-Generality: V (∀Yα)⇔ ΠV ′(V Y©V ′ ⇒ V ′(α))
Apodicticity: V (α)⇔ ΠV ′(VRV ′ ⇒ V ′(α))
1-Rhombicity: (VRV ′&V ′ y©V ′′)⇒ ΣV ′′′(V y©V ′′′&V ′′′RV ′′)
1-Quadrangularity: (V y©V ′&V ′RV ′′)⇒ ΣV ′′′(VRV ′′′&V ′′′ y©V ′′)
2-Rhombicity: (VRV ′&V ′Y©V ′′)⇒ ΣV ′′′(V Y©V ′′′&V ′′′RV ′′)
2-Quadrangularity: (V Y©V ′&V ′RV ′′)⇒ ΣV ′′′(VRV ′′′&V ′′′Y©V ′′)
3-Rhombicity: (VRV ′&V ′ Y©V ′′)⇒ ΣV ′′′(V Y©V ′′′&V ′′′RV ′′)
3-Quadrangularity: (V Y©V ′&V ′RV ′′)⇒ ΣV ′′′(VRV ′′′&V ′′′ Y©V ′′)
1-Indifference: (V (α) & x /∈ FV(α))⇒ ΠV ′(V x©V ′ ⇒ V ′(α))
2-Indifference: (V (α) & X /∈ FV(α))⇒ ΠV ′(V X©V ′ ⇒ V ′(α))
3-Indifference: (V (α) & X /∈ FV(α))⇒ ΠV ′(V X©V ′ ⇒ V ′(α))
If 1-Rhombicity and 1-Quadrangularity had not been assumed and
we had deleted references to principles of higher order, we would have
generated a Kripke style semantics as in [19] for first order modal logic
with the peculiar restrictions on the use of open sentences. As I see
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it, 1-Rhombicity and 1-Quadrangularity are plausible principles, but the
associated first order Barcan Formula and its converse are not needed in
the derivation of the Sacred Thesis below.
I mention en passant that I welcome the necessitist consequences of
adopting the first order Barcan formula and its converse. The necessitist
point of view that all things exist necessarily has been most extensively
defended by Timothy Williamson in [30] and foreshadowed by [31], and
it was also implicit in [20]. The author independently came up with a
necessitist point of view in the lecture [7]. The argument for necessiticm
in the evaluationist framework is different, and appeals to there being
such a plenitude of valuations in the evaluation so that 1-Rhombicity
and 1-Quadrangularity obtain.
2.4.3. Semantical validations
We first establish the basic truth functional conditions for valuations
given the definitions (B) to (F) in section 2.1 and the conditions for NOR
in section 2.4.2 and our metalinguistic conventions. We presuppose the
truth functional logic of the meta language and take previous steps into
account as we proceed:
NOT V (¬α)⇔ V (↓ αα)⇔ (∼V (α) &∼V (α))⇔ not V (α)
OR V (α ∨ β)⇔ V (↓↓ αβ ↓ αβ)⇔ (∼V (↓ αβ) &∼V (↓ αβ))
⇔ not V (↓ αβ)⇔ not (∼V (α) &∼V (β))⇔ (V (α) or V (β))
AND V (α ∧ β)⇔ V (↓↓ αα ↓ ββ)⇔ (∼V (↓ αα) &∼V (↓ ββ)))
⇔ (∼V (¬α) and∼V (¬β))⇔ (V (α) and V (β))
IF V (α→ β)⇔ V (¬α ∨ β)⇔ (not-V (α) or V (β))
IFF V (α↔ β)⇔ (V (α→ β) and V (β → α))
In validating the axioms of Q3S5 we in each case assume that there is
an evaluation model to the contrary and derive a contradiction, and we
assume that the relation R in the modelM = 〈D,E,R〉 is an equivalence
relation.
We now validate the axiom schemas of Q3S5 as provided in 2.2:
A1-3 These follow from NOT, OR, AND, IF and IFF.
K Suppose a valuation V has V (α) and V ((α → β)) and not
V (β). From the latter, V (¬β) so that V (♦¬β) and so ΣV ′(V RV ′ &
∼V ′(β)), and we let V ∗ be a representative so that V RV ∗ &∼V ∗(β)).
From the former ΠV ′(V RV ′ ⇒ V ′(α)) and ΠV (V RV ′ ⇒ V ′(α → β))
so that by truth functionality of valuations ΠV ′(V RV ′ ⇒ V ′(β)), and
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so by instantiation with the representative V ∗ we get (V RV ∗ ⇒ V ∗(β))
which contradicts V RV ∗ &mathop∼V ∗(β).
4 Assume V ((α)) and not V ((α)). From these we derive that
ΠV ′(VRV ′ ⇒ V ′(α)) and ΣV ′, V ′′(VRV ′ & V ′RV ′′ &∼V ′′(α)). As R
is transitive it follows that ΣV ′(VRV ′ &∼V ′(α)), so we have a contra-
diction.
B Assume V (α) and not V (♦α). It follows that V (α) and V (♦¬α),
so that V (α) and ΣV ′(VRV ′&ΠV ′′(V ′RV ′′ ⇒ ∼V ′′(α)))). By a choice
of instantiation in the latter we have that VRV ′&V ′RV ⇒ ∼ V (α))),
and that V (α). As R is supposed to be symmetric we derive that V ′RV
and the contradiction that V (α) and ∼V (α).
T Assume to the contrary that V (α) and not V (α)). Frome these we
have that ΠV ′(VRV ′ ⇒ V ′(α)) and not V (α), and so by instantiation
VRV ⇒ V (α) and not V (α). As R is reflexive we have a contradiction.
Q0
0
a) Assume V (∀xα) and not V (∀xα). From the former
we deduce ΠV ′(V x©V ′ ⇒ ΠV ′′(V ′RV ′′ ⇒ V ′′(α))) and from the lat-
ter we derive that ΣV ′(VRV ′ & ΣV ′′(V ′ x©V ′′ & ∼V ′′(α))). Let V ∗
and V ∗∗ be representatives so that VRV ∗ & V ∗ x©V ∗∗ & ∼V ∗∗(α)).
By 1-Rhombicity we find a V ∗∗∗ such that (V x©V ∗∗∗ & V ∗∗∗RV ∗∗ &
∼V ∗∗(α)). If we now instantiate with with V ∗∗∗ and then with V ∗∗ in
ΠV ′(V x©V ′ ⇒ ΠV ′′(V ′RV ′′ ⇒ V ′′(α))) aabsurdity follows. b) Assume
V (∀xα) and not V (∀xα). A contradiction is derived as in a) by
invoking 1-Quadrangularity.
Q1
0
As Q0
0
, but invoking 2-Rhombicity and 2-Quadrangularity.
Q2
0
As Q0
0
, but invoking 3-Rhombicity and 3-Quadrangularity.
Q0
1
Suppose V ((∀x)α) and not V (α⌈t/x⌉), where t is substitutable
for x in α. We then have ΠV ′(V x©V ′ ⇒ V ′(α)) and not V (α⌈t/x⌉). Let
V x©V ′ and V ′(x) = V (t), which entails that V ′(α) and that V ′(α) ⇔
V (α⌈t/x⌉). A contradiction follows as we also assumed not V (α⌈t/x⌉).
Q1
1
As Q0
1
.
Q2
1
As Q0
1
.
Q0
2
Suppose V (∀x(α→ β)), V (∀xα) and not V (∀xβ)). It follows that
ΠV ′(V x©V ′ ⇒ V ′(α → β)), ΠV ′(V x©V ′ ⇒ V ′(α)) and ΣV ′(V x©V ′ &
∼V (β)). Let V x©V ∗ & not V ∗(β), and instantiate in the first to get
V x©V ∗ ⇒ V ∗(α → β) and V x©V ∗ ⇒ V ∗(α). By detachment and repe-
tition we have V ∗(α) and V ∗(α→ β) and not V ∗(β), so a contradiction
follows by the truth functionality of V ∗.
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Q1
2
As Q0
2
.
Q22 As Q
0
2.
Q0
3
By 1-Indifference.
Q1
3
By 2-Indifference.
Q2
3
By 3-Indifference.
2.5. The comprehensive metaphysical system Q3S5Π
1,2
1,1
The metaphysical system Q3S5Π1,21,1 comes about by adding the follow-
ing impredicative parametrized second and third order comprehension
schemas 2C and 3C to the logic Q3S5, as we to make space employ
conventional vector notation to abbreviate that we may have several
succeeding variables:
2C ∀~x∀ ~X∃Y ∀y(Y y ↔ ∀~Zβ(~x, y, ~X, ~Z)) for β any ∆10 formula.
3C ∀~x∀ ~X∀~X∃Y∀Y (YY ↔ ∀~Zβ(~x, Y, ~X,~X, ~Z)) for β any Σ11 formula.
2.6. Higher order modal logics
Higher order modal logic was appealed to in the work of Montague to
account for phenomena in the semantics of natural language in a series
of very influential papers [23, 24, 25] which were also reprinted in the
collection [29]. The monograph [14] of Montague’s student Gallin devel-
ops Montague’s Intensional Logic further. In the useful survey article
[26] Muskens also relate the work of Bressan on higher order modal log-
ics in the monograph [8] which was motivated by axiomatizing classical
mechanics.
In a standard semantics for a second order logic the second order
quantifiers are taken to range over the full power set ℘(D) of the domain
D presupposed for the firt order quantifyers. In a Henkin semantics it
is instead presupposed that the second order quantifiers range over a
general structure which extends pre-structures built from the domain D
such that all second order comprehension principles are validated.
Our investigation shall be carried through with a third order monadic
modal predicate logic extending a second order monadic modal predicate
logic which in its turn extends a first order modal predicate logic.
We do not need first order UI or EG in the derivation of the Sa-
cred Theses. So we might have presupposed a free logic as discussed
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towards the end of 2.4.2, though extended with higher order principles
as indicated.
We mention that Hájek in [16, 17] uses moderate cautious compre-
hension whereas Sobel appeals to full comprehension in the criticism of
Gödel, and also Anderson uses full second order comprehension in his
rectification of Gödel’s proof. Also Hájek’s “vorsichtige Komprehension”
is impredicative.
3. Deriving the Sacred Thesis
The terms K-axiom, T -axiom, B-axiom, 4-axiom and 5-axiom have their
expected meaning as from the literature (cfr. also section 2.2); we sup-
press the appendage “schema” for brevity, and overlook that the ax-
iom schemas so named are not independent of each other. We assume
that gothic majuscules stand for monadic third order predicate letters,
and α⌈M/N⌉ denotes the formula obtained from replacing all occur-
rences of third order predicate letter N in formula α with third order
predicate letter M. We consider formula α modally operative in C iff
∀H(AH → BH) entails that (α⌈A/C⌉ → α⌈B/C⌉). If we disregard
the contribution modal operators make to complexity and comprehensive
strength it turns out that just an instance of Π21-comprehension to obtain
a third order property D and an instance of Π11-comprehension with D
as parameter to isolate second order property G are the impredicative
principles needed for the crucial definitions needed to obtain the sacred
thesis.
Use the modal Π21-comprehension principle of Q
3S5Π1,21,1 to obtain:
(0) ∃X∀X(XX ↔ ∀Y((∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX)→ YX))
Existentially instantiate with the constant D:
(1) ∀X(DX ↔ ∀Y((∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX)→ YX))
It follows that:
(2) ∀X∀Y((∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX)→ (DX → YX))
In third order S5 the following is a thesis:
(3) ∀X∀Y((∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX)↔
(∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX))
So by a hypothetical syllogism the following is a thesis of third order S5:
(4) ∀X∀Y((∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX)→ (DX → YX))
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By necessitation and the second and third order converse Barcan formu-
las:
(5) ∀X∀Y((∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX)→ (DX → YX))
By the K-axiom and an application of the 4-axiom it follows that:
(6) ∀X∀Y((∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX)→ (DX → YX))
On account of (3) and (6):
(7) ∀X∀Y((∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX)→ (DX → YX))
By the modal operativity of ∀x(∀Y (BY → Y x)→ Xx) in B:
(8) ∀X∀Y((DX → YX)→
(∀x(∀Y (DY → Y x)→ Xx)→ ∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)))
From (7) and (8) by a hypothetical syllogism:
(9) ∀X∀Y((∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX)→
(∀x(∀Y (DY → Y x)→ Xx)→ ∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)))
By a truth functional argument on (9):
(10) ∀X∀Y((∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX)→
(∀x(∀Y (DY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX))
By universal instantiation and change of order:
(11) ∀x(∀Y (DY → Y x)→ Xx)→
∀Y((∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX)→ YX))
By the T -axiom:
(12) ∀x(∀Y (DY → Y x)→ Xx)→
∀Y((∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx)→ YX)→ YX)
By (1) and (12) and universal generalization and necessitation:
(13) ∀X(∀x(∀Y (DY → Y x)→ Xx)→ DX)
Use third order comprehension with D as parameter and existential in-
stantiation to define F so that:
(14) ∀X(FX ↔ ∀x(∀Y (DY → Y x)→ Xx))
From (13) and (14) we have:
(15) ∀X(FX → DX)
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By the modal operativity of ∀x(∀Y (YY → Y x)→ Xx) in Y we have:
(16) ∀x(∀I(FI → Ix)→ Xx)→ ∀x(∀I(DI → Ix)→ Xx)
By (14) and (16) we have:
(17) ∀x(∀Y (FY → Y x)→ Xx)→ FX
By the 4-axiom of third order S5 we have:
(18) ∀x(∀Y (FY → Y x)→ Xx)→ FX
By (18) and an instance of (1) it follows:
(19) ∀X(DX → FX)
Combining (15) and (19) we have:
(20) ∀X(DX ↔ FX)
Using (14), this is to say:
(21) ∀X(DX ↔ ∀x(∀Y (DY → Y x)→ Xx))
Define, by using second order comprehension with parameter D:
(22) ∃X∀x(Xx↔ ∀Y (DY → Y x))
Existentially instantiate with second order constant G:
(23) ∀x(Gx↔ ∀Y (DY → Y x))
From substitution of (23) in (21):
(24) ∀X(DX ↔ ∀x(Gx→ Xx))
From (24) and the fact that ∀x(Gx→ Gx) is a thesis:
(25) DG
By the 4-axiom:
(26) DG
From (24) and the fact that ♦∃x(Gx ∧ ¬Xx)→ ♦∃x(Gx):
(27) ¬DX → ♦∃x(Gx)
From (23) by instantiation, simplification and permutation:
(28) (DG→ ∀x(Gx→ Gx))
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From (26) and (28) and the K-axiom:
(29) ∀x(Gx→ Gx)
From (29) and quantifier rules:
(30) (∃xGx→ ∃xGx)
The following is a theorem of all quantified modal logics:
(31) (∃xGx→ ∃xGx)
From (30) and (31):
(32) (∃xGx→ ∃xGx)
From (32) and the 4-axiom:
(33) (∃xGx→ ∃xGx)
From (33) using an equivalent of the K-axiom:
(34) ♦∃xGx→ ♦∃xGx
From the B-axiom:
(35) ♦∃xGx→ ∃xGx
From (34) and (35):
(36) ♦∃xGx→ ∃xGx
From (27) and (36):
(37) ¬DX → ∃xGx
As X is arbitrary, by generalization:
(38) ∀X(¬DX → ∃xGx)
From the quantifier rules:
(39) ∃X¬DX → ∃xGx
By connective rules and interdefinability we have:
(40) ∀XDX ∨∃xGx
4. Bonds and theorems
This is not the occasion to expound the extensive literature initiated
by the circulation of Gödel’s handwritten note, and such an endeavor
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would at any rate fall outside the scope of the author’s competence. In
[28] Sobel showed that the assumptions of Gödel in [15] lead to modal
collapse in the sense that α ↔ α becomes a thesis with Gödel for
all formulas α; but confer Hájek’s qualification referred to in the next
section. In [1] Anderson presented a rectified ontological argument that
avoids the problem pointed out by Sobel.
We list a translation of Gödel’s Definition 1 (DG1), Anderson’s first
definition (DA1) and the first four of Anderson’s five axiomatic assump-
tions (AA1-4) into our idiolect with divine instead of positive and a use
of overline for denoting the complement of a property; we stress that
just AA3 is a proper axiom:
DG1 Gx , ∀I(DI → Ix)
DA1 Gx , ∀I(DI ↔ Ix)
AA1 DA→ ¬DA¯
AA2 DA ∧∀x(Ax→ Bx)→ DB
AA3 DG
AA4 DA→ DA
In our idiolect Gödel presupposed an axiom AG1 stating that DA↔
¬DA¯ instead of Anderson’s AA1, and the translation of Gödel’s AG2 to
AG4 would be as AA2 to AA4. Anderson and Gödel further presupposed
axiomatically that some defined property akin to necessary existence is
divine, and below we refer to these respective assumptions as AA5 and
AG5.
We use a modification of Gödel’s DG1 and Anderson’s DA1:
D Gx , ∀I(DI → Ix)
Theorem 0. (i) The biconditional of definition D,(ii) AA2, (iii) AA3,
and (iv) AA4 are theses of S5Π1,21,1.
Proof. (i) By step (23) of Section 3. (ii) From step (24) of Section 3
and the transitivity of strict implication. (iii) By step (25) of Sec-
tion 3. (iv) By step (21) and other steps of Section 3 and the 4-axiom
of Q3S5Π1,21,1
We leave it as an exercise to establish:
Theorem 1. Q3S5Π1,21,1 + ∃X¬DX ⊢ AA1 and
Q3S5Π1,21,1 + AA1 ⊢ ∃X¬DX
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We next establish that Q3S5Π1,21,1 + ∃X¬DX does not have all sen-
tences as consequences:
Theorem 2. Q3S5Π1,21,1 + ∃X¬DX has a model.
Proof. Let the set E of valuations be a singleton set {V }, the domain
D = D0∪D1∪D2 whereD0 = {g} is the domain for the first order quanti-
fiers, D1 = {{g}, ∅} is the domain for the second order quantifiers and the
domain for the third order quantifiers is D2 = {∅, {∅}, {∅, {g}}, {{g}}}.
The accessibility relation R on E is {〈V, V 〉}. We leave it as an exercise
to verify that a model with these ingredients serves.
Theorems 0 to 2 justify us in thinking of the derivation of the salient
conclusion of Q3S5Π1,21,1 + ∃X¬DX in such terms as have been used in
the literature on modal ontological argument in the tradition from [15].
We define a = b in a Leibnizian-Russellian manner as given by the
formula ∀F (Fa → Fb). It is straightforward to show that identity so
taken is symmetric given the impredicative second order comprehension
principle. Identity of second order predicates can be isolated analogously
by an appeal to our third order impredicative comprehension.
In the following we make use of Church’s lambda operator so that
λxFx is an alternative name for the property F .
Theorem 3 (The Monotheorem).
If Gg and Dλx(x = g), then ∀x(Gx→ x = g).
Proof. Given (24) in Section 3 we have Dλx(x = g) ↔ ∀x(Gx →
λx(x = g)x). As we assume Dλx(x = g) we have ∀x(Gx → λx(x =
g)x), so that by beta abstraction we have ∀x(Gx→ x = g).
5. Pinpoints and diagnoses
We will in this paper not scrutinize possible objections towards the use
of the logical and metaphysical apparatus invoked, and now just mention
en passant that the use of systems such as our third order modal logic
has been pointed to e.g. in [14, 30].
It nevertheless bears mentioning that we have invoked a rather im-
predicative system that some philosopers with a predicativist bent are
prone to find dubious. Precisely the quasi circularity with impredica-
tive principles such as we have invoked has been an aversion to pred-
icativists, and those in the mathemathical minority who want to press
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predicativist points of views may raise similar doubts concerning other
ontological arguments. Feferman in [11] gives a good introduction to the
predicativist point of view and its tradition back to Cohen, Poincaré and
Russell at the beginning of the previous century. It is popular to dis-
agree with predicativist strictures for being too prohibitive as concerns
self-reference.
In my opinion, a respectable framework for thinking about modal
matters should also deal properly with modal paradoxes, as isolated by
Montague in [22] and others, in some comprehensive way that also deals
with the set theoretical paradoxes and thus accounts more appropriately
for the foundation of mathematics. Some readers may at this point find
it relevant to consult the author’s take on the paradoxes in his alternative
set theory £ as so far set out in [4, 5] and in some preceding work.
The definiens of definition D in Section 4 is employed crucially in step
(1) of Section 3, and the definiens of Anderson’s definition DA1 could not
have been so presupposed for the formula ∀x(∀I(GI ↔ Ix) → Hx)
is not modally operative in G as the latter has negative occurrences in
the former.
In [16, 17] Hájek improves upon an, as it turns out, just slightly
insufficient model theoretic argument by Magari in [21] to the effect
that Gödel’s AG1, AG2 and AG3 already suffice for the derivation of
the theistic main theorem. Magari’s idea is confirmed as applied to An-
derson’s argument for Hájek shows that Anderson’s AA3 and AA4 are
superfluous in the presence of full second order modal comprehension
with the underlying logic. Hájek also shows that such a comprehensive
Andersonian argument is interpretable in Gödel’s original set of axioms
with a cautious comprehension principle, and that such a cautious ver-
sion of Gödel’s argument does not lead to the modal collapse which Sobel
derived presupposing full comprehension in [28]. The reader is sent to
Hájek’s articles for more details.
In [2] the author showed that a simplification using just a part of
Gödel’s first axiom and some version of his last axiom suffices for the
theistic conclusion, and it was noted that a combination with Hájek’s
independent result can be obtained to simplify matters further. This
article delivers upon the promise of such an improved result.
We mention that [2] was referred to by André Fuhrmann in [13], and
he correctly related the point that we in [2] take the property of being
Godlike as primitive unlike Gödel’s more Leibnizian approach of taking
the second order property positive (with us divine) as primitive. This
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issue as to what is more primitive of divine and God disappears in our
third order framework.
One may use the negation of the first disjunct of the sacred thesis as
premise in an ontological argument for the necessary existence of a God,
and we say that that argument is the ontological argument supported by
the sacred thesis. The said ontological argument is naturally analyzed
by a fixed point strategy, and we summarily state some upshots. A
least fixed point is atheist, and atheists are committed to the point of
view that all properties are divine in the sense of our definition. There
may be theistic fixed points which commit to properties which are not
divine, and such fixed points have simple models as in Theorem 2. The
content of Theorem 3, the Monotheorem, is that if there is a God and
being identical with a God is a divine property then also monotheism is
true. On account of the given fixed point diagnosis one may resist the
objection by [27] towards Gödelian ontological arguments that arbitrary
second order properties may be substituted for divine.
It bears noticing that the sacred thesis and its ontological argument
do not depend upon there being some maximum for properties like being
positive or being perfect, as with Anselm or Leibniz and others. Neverthe-
less, somewhat Gaunilo-like objections remain and corresponding to the
sacred thesis there is e.g. a similar diabolical thesis and related theses for
other second order properties and their associated presumptive bearers.
Statements as the sacred thesis and kindred theses do not by themselves
carry ontological commitments, however. Notice that by our results the
fixed point analysis propounded here applies as well to related modal
ontological arguments.
6. Apathiatheistic appendage
Our attitude to arguments such as the ontological argument supported
by the sacred thesis carries information concerning our attitude to rati-
ocination or ontology which may be of some wider interest. As I see it,
the word “God” is well nigh maximally imprecise so that it seems rather
unhelpful to be a militant atheist without clarifying what interpretation
one has of the word; by the same token, it is not so useful to be a zeal-
ous theist. We are certainly all militant atheists with respect to some
interpretations of the word “God” and no serious person is a theist with
respect to more than a small range of interpretations of the word. Notice
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that one initially better takes “God” to express a predicate so as to not
favor monotheism and so as to avoid certain befuddlements concerning
supposedly non-referring names.
I have, as opposed to the theophilic and theophobic attitudes con-
sidered by Magari in [21], come to adopt what I call an apathiatheistic
opinion according to which the best concepts ‘God’ cum understandings
of reality are such that the question as to whether there is a God or not
is academic in a sense similar to the question as to whether there are
holes or just holed things. If God is such an object as apathiatheism
requires then there is, as I see it, not sufficient untowardness ratiocina-
tively or ontologically with accepting the soundness of the ontological
argument supported by the sacred thesis for this to be ruled out. From
an apathiatheistic point of view atheist thinkers may as well engage
in religious discourse as theological anti realists who take “God” as a
theoretical term, and I do not see that apathiatheism is in conflict with
reasonable theologies. Arguably, the most important religious question
is not whether there is a God but whether something ultimately rectifies
the unsayable sufferings in the world; I have scrutinized this and related
religious and philosophical questions in [6].
However these matters are, from my apatiatheistic point of view the
world may be as if there is a God even though there is no God and it
may be as if there is no God even though there is a God.
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